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The maximum possible number of independent diversified sources of ideas to
foster the development and continuity of our open competitive society and the
evolution of its free institutions has been established as the conceptual base for the
operation of our broadcast structure.' However, inherent in our commercial system
of television broadcasting is danger that these high aspirations may be progressively
eroded by the practicalities of attracting economic support for television program
service through advertising. To permit such a result would be to subordinate the
paramount interests of the public in a free market for ideas to commercial interest
in a market for goods and services. This paper will deal with an important phase of
the conflict between the public interest and the needs of commercial broadcasting-
the growth of concentration of control of the television program procurement
process.
Thomas Jefferson, to whose words and ideas we may safely return in evaluating
the needs and usages of a democratic society, could not have imagined a system of
instantaneous and pervasive communications such as we are provided by television
today. But he understood the requirements of a free people and spoke in terms
which are valid for the governance of television as a social implement. His faith
in common men assumed their wish to be provided sources of information and ideas
to fulfill their need to make informed decisions affecting their common welfare.
He foresaw quite prophetically that the future of a democratic society could not
be secured by the "state of science, no matter how exalted it may be, in the minds of
a select band of enlightened men . . . ." Progress in the general welfare depends on
* Opinions and conclusions expressed in this paper are those of the author and not those of the
Federal Communications Commission or any Commissioner. Much of the material contained herein is
found in greater detail in three reports by the author: (1) INTEm REPORT BY THE OFFICE oF NETWORK
STUDY, RESPONSIBILITY FOR BROADCAST MATTER (F.C.C., x96o), reprinted in TELEVSION NErVwORr PRO-
oRAM PROCUREMENT, H.R. REP. No. 281, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 197 (1963) [hereinafter cited as INTERIM
REPORT]; (2) SECOND INTERIM REPORT BY THE OFFICE OF NETWORK STUDY, TELEvISION NETWORK
PROGPAM PROCUREMENT pt. I, H.R. REP. No. 281, 88th Cong., ist Sess. 13 (1963); and (3) SECOND
INTERIM REPORT BY THE OFFICE OF NETWoRK STUDY, TELEVISION NETWoRK PROGRAM PROCUREMENT
pt. II (F.C.C., 1965) [hereinafter cited as PART I, SECOND INTERIM REPORT].
t Chief, Office of Network Study, Federal Communications Commission.
'See Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. (945); FCC Report on Editorializing, 13 F.C.C.
1246 (949).
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the "condition of the general mind."2 This reliance upon the "general mind"
as the ultimate arbiter of social, cultural, and political choices remains the only
feasible basis for development of our society in the vital and dangerous age in which
we live. But such reliance must be bottomed on the availability to the public through
our mass media-particularly television, the most powerful instrument thus far
devised-of the ideas, information, and stimuli necessary to the enlightened choices
and fateful decisions it will be called upon to make. Television is unique among the
mass media in that it provides a social mechanism capable of uniting individuals in
concerted response to common stimuli on a scale and at a speed undreamed of until
recent times. Quite apparently, whether this vast and potent implement is useful
for good or for evil will depend on the images which it imposes on the general
mind
The importance of free discussion and open access to ideas was well stated by
John Stuart Mill in the last century:4
Where there is a tacit convention that principles are not to be disputed; where
the discussion of the greatest questions which can occupy humanity is considered
to be closed, we cannot hope to find that generally high scale of mental activity
which has made some periods of history so remarkable. Never when controversy
avoided the subjects which are large and important enough to kindle enthusiasm,
was the mind of a people stirred up from its foundations, and the impulse given
which raised even persons of the most ordinary intellect to something of the dignity
of thinking beings.
There seems little doubt that network television properly used is an instrument
capable of "stirring up" the foundations of thought and raising our people to the
level of "thinking beings." Indeed, a communications system fraught with greater
possibilities for good or harm to ourselves and our free institutions has never before
existed on so large a scale.
The courts and the Federal Communications Commission have developed a
conceptual framework within which our communications system-despite its
2 As cited in H.R. REP. No. 281, 88th Cong., ist Sess. 29 (1963).
As William Ernest Hocking has said with respect to the effect of television on the public mind:
"The motive of the consumer is described in terms of 'entertainment' and 'information'; it is
seldom that he deliberately seeks 'education' there. [But] an unintended education takes place,
perhaps the more effective because unintended ...
:'[ , [ Without intention, the radio-TV pabulum becomes weighted in favor of the animal end
of the emotional scale; and the incidental education moves not from the primitive to the
advanced but from the advanced to the primitive ....
[ .. T]he question cannot be evaded whether this type of entertainment by de-civilizing-at-
the-source, at work on a hundred million people day by day, can fail to affect and be affected by
a public interest in maintaining civilization. If so, this unintended education-in-reverse demands
a type of public attention which the media themselves [because of their necessary pre-occupation
with the commercial aspects of the medium] are not in a position to furnish."
Official Report at 1229-30, Study of Radio and Television Network Broadcasting Before the Federal
Communications Commission, No. 12782 (959).
'ON LIBERTY 32 (E. Halderman-Julius ed. 1925).
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clearly centripetal urge-may operate to preserve and promote a healthy diversity of
thought and expression in our society. In essence this framework relies for preserva-
tion of the public interest upon the fostering and development of diverse and
competitive creative sources for the content of our broadcast service."
No matter how disinterested may be their motives in providing the stuff for
the American "market for ideas," the effort of a small commercial elite cannot
adequately serve the needs of a free and dynamic people. In our open competitive
society implementation of the basic leaven to human intellect protected by the
first amendment of the Constitution "rests on the assumption that the widest possible
dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to
the welfare of the public, that a free press is a condition of a free society."' Broad-
casting is a form of expression entitled to the protection of the first amendment,'
but its technological and operational differences from other media justify differences
in the way first amendment standards are applied to it." The right of free speech
may not be used by broadcasters to "snuff out" the free speech of others It is the
right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is para-
mount' 0 These principles, clearly enunciated over the years in the Supreme
Court but sometimes watered down in practice, have recently been reaffirmed by
the Court in a forceful and unequivocal opinion by Mr. Justice White. Among
other things, he restated that under the first amendment it is the principal responsi-
bility of licensed broadcasters "to preserve an uninhibited market-place of ideas in
which truth will ultimately prevail ... [through] suitable access [for the public]
to social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences."" This is not
a matter of discretion or grace on the part of broadcasters. These are rights in-
hering in the public which must be validated and which "may not constitutionally
be abridged."
The practicalities of commerce frequently run counter to an idealistic interpreta-
tion of the public interest in the advancement of art, culture, and public wisdom
through mass communications means. This seems inevitable in a commercial
system. However, it should be kept in mind that electronic mass communications
are still in their beginning stages and the end of their development is, of course,
not in sight. It seems important that their future use and development be governed
'See National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (942), for a detailed discussion of
the broad and comprehensive nature of the Commission's authority. See also American Bond & Mort-
gage Co. v. United States, 52 F.2d 318 (7 th Cir. 1931); Trinity Methodist Church v. Federal Radio
Commission, 62 F.2d 85o (D.C. Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 288 U.S. 599 (1933).
' Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
'United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 166 (947). See generally Loevinger, Free
Speech, Fairness, and Fiduciary Duty in Broadcasting, in part I of this symposium, p. 278.
SJoseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 503 (1952).
' Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. r (r945).
"FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 475 (1940).
"Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969). Justice Holmes' phraseology in
his famous dissent in Abrams v. United States, 25o U.S. 616, 63o (i919), casts its luminous image fifty
years later.
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by democratic principles of equality and fairness. High on the list of values which
must be preserved is that of enlightened public service based on a diversity of
uninhibited tongues. This can best be accomplished by preservation of competitive
opportunity in both the economic and creative aspects of the medium.'2 Above all,
the public interest requires that avenues be kept open within the network television
structure to insure the continuing availability of numerous and diverse program
sources. Recent as well as long-standing trends suggest that there is cause for
concern on this score.
II
EARLY HISTORY
Problems of concentration which presently confront the broadcasting industry
began early. At the outset of broadcasting, considerable difference of opinion existed
as to how its development and operation should be financed. It was obvious that
some stable and continuing source of economic support was essential. Some believed
that the government should undertake subsidy of broadcasting activities as a public
service. A larger group thought that the industry itself-the manufacturers and
distributors of radio sets and parts-should contribute to the support of broadcast
stations as a means of stimulating sales. There were a number of other suggestions
made and a lively debate was under way throughout the country.'" But, as is fre-
quendy the case, commerce superseded dialogue, and a stable source of economic
support for radio through advertising revenues was discovered almost by accident. 4
From then on there was litde doubt as to how radio would ultimately be supported.
Indeed, advertising has been described as the "Fairy Godmother" of broadcasting. 5
Although it was many years before the role of advertising in our broadcast structures
was developed and defined-in some aspects the role is still undefined-the use of
radio as a powerful and popular advertising medium solved the problem as to
whence economic support would be supplied.
12 Competition for mass audience is not the whole of the public interest in television. The needs
and tastes of significant minority audiences must be served in due proportion. However, particularly
in entertainment, the diverse interests of advertisers-institutional and otherwise--if permitted full
expression on networks will go a long way toward support of a sufficient diversity in programming to
satisfy many of these minority needs.
" For instance, on June 17, 1922, in a letter to Mr. E. W. Rice, then honorary chairman of the
board of the General Electric Company, David Sarnoff, a leading figure in the subsequent development
of radio as a mass medium, wrote:
"[T]he cost of broadcasting must be borne by those who derive profits directly or indirectly
from the business resulting from radio broadcasting. This means the manufacturer, the national
distributor, the Radio Corp. of America, the wholesale distributor, the retail dealer, the licensee
and others associated in one way or another with the business."
PART HI, SEcoaN Isramuam RPosT 62.
"' "So rapid was the evolution that before noncommercial alternatives bad reached the stage of
public formulation and discussion, the Nation was committed to a policy of broadcasting support by
commercial advertisers." M. WiLLEY & S. RicE, CoMasUNxcAroNs AoENcIEs AND SOCnUL LiFE 197
(Recent Social Trends Monographs, 1933).
"
5 T. RoBINsoD, RAnio NFrwoRsus AmD Ta FFamnA. GOVEMNMENT 23-24 (1943).
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Commercial advertising was not universally approved as the best means of
assuring the optimum use of radio as a mass communications service. Indeed, a
number of those who fostered its growth and pioneered its development as an
implement for public service "feared" that commercial advertising would soon
dominate radio and derogate from its social utility."6 However, the evolution of
radio as a medium first of local and then of national advertising proceeded so
rapidly and was so readily accepted by the public that advertising revenues quickly
became-and have remained-the sole support of the American system of broad-
casting.
As a result of this newly discovered commercial value of radio, a very rapid
"In 1924, Herbert Hoover said:
"I believe the quickest way to kill broadcasting would be to use it for direct advertising....
[I]f a speech by the President is to be used as the meat in a sandwich of two patent medicine
advertisements, there will be no radio left. To what extent it may be employed for what we now
call indirect advertising I do not know, and only experience with the reaction of listeners can tell.
The listeners will finally decide in any event."
Opening address at the Third Annual National Radio Conference, Oct. 6, 1924, in RECOMMENDATIONS
Post REGULATION oF RADIO 4 (1924). See PART II, SECOND INTERIm REPORT iir.
[Interestingly enough, Broadcasting, ir its issue of August I, 1969, at 15, includes a letter from
Frank Miller, formerly a Vice President of RCA and NBC, who participated in the 1924 Radio Con-
ference. He writes that the Committee on Advertising of the Conference (of which he was a member)
was responsive to the suggestions of Herbert Hoover, then Secretary of Commerce, in its position on
advertising: "As I recall, we labored all week drafting a resolution calling for nothing but indirect
advertising on radio, and banning the direct sales pitch. It was passed unanimously."
Likewise, it is interesting to speculate what our broadcast service would be like today if industry
had continued to present only "indirect" advertising. However, by 1930 "indirect" advertising had gone
by the board and the "sales pitch" had taken over. By 1932 the situation had gotten so bad that
Congress seriously proposed the possibility that the advertiser-supported system be abandoned and a new
method of broadcast operation be sought. For a brief description of this very interesting phase of the
history of broadcasting, see INsEasus REPORT 301.]
In its report of i929, the Federal Radio Commission, predecessor of the FCC, quoted from the
Commission's opinion in Matter of Great Lakes Broadcasting Co.:
"The Commission must, however, recognize that, without advertising, broadcasting would not
exist, and must confine itself to limiting this advertising in amount and in character so as to
preserve the largest possible amount of service for the public. . . . Advertising must be accepted
for the present as the sole means of support for broadcasting, and regulation must be relied
upon to prevent abuse and overuse of the privilege."
3 FRC ANN. REP. 35 (1929) (emphasis added).
Previously, in its Annual Report for z928, as part of an over-all statement relevant to the "public
interest, convenience, or necessity," the Commission said:
"While it is true that broadcasting stations in this country are for the most part supported
or partially supported by advertisers, broadcasting stations are not givens these great privileges by
the United States Government for the primary benefit of advertisers. Such benefit as is derived by
advertisers must be incidental and entirely secondary to the interest of the public."
2 FRC ANN. REP. 168 (1928).
On December 21, 1931, the Commission, in a formal statement (The Use of Broadcasting or Adver-
tising Purposes) calling attention to the Code of Ethics which had recently been adopted by the National
Association of Broadcasters said:
"The principal objection to programs under our system arise [sic] out of the kind of adver-
tising that is allowed to be made a part of them.
". . . There is not a single station that can escape responsibility. A heavy responsibility
rests upon all chain companies .. "
FRC Release No. 5950, cited in ITrERmu REPORT 306.
CONCENTRATION OF TV PROGRAM CONTROL 615
proliferation of stations followed within a very short period of time. The spectrum
was soon found to be inadequate to accommodate within the preferred wave lengths
all those who sought to use the medium. Stations overlapped each other and raised
their power in attempts to pre-empt the air. Herbert Hoover, then Secretary of
Commerce, sought to govern the storm by issuing licenses under the Radio Act of
i912,17 which was not designed for and was ill-suited to regulation of broadcast
stations. His efforts were partially successful until the courts held in effect that
the Secretary had no authority under the act to allocate frequencies and require
adherence to his orders.' Hoover then abandoned his efforts to regulate radio
and urged that the stations seek to solve the problem through self-regulation. But,
as has frequently occurred, industry rendered lip service but little else to the self-
regulatory theory.
From July 1926, when regulation collapsed, to February 1927, when Congress
enacted the Radio Act of I927,19 almost 200 new radio stations went on the air. They
broadcasted on any frequency they wished, raised their power to blot each other
out, and operated at will. The result was confusion and chaos. With everybody on
the air, virtually no one could be heard. This series of events and the ensuing
chaos on the air waves led directly to the enactment of the Radio Act of 19 27 .
This bit of history may help in the evaluation of the industry's often repeated
claim that many of its serious problems can and should be solved by voluntary
self-regulation. The original regulation of broadcasting-at least its form and
content-was greatly accelerated, if not made necessary, by the failure of industry
members to respond to Secretary Hoover's plea that they take steps to regulate
themselves in the interest of avoiding chaos.
III
DEVELOPMENT OF THE REGULATORY STANDARD-THE PUBLIC INTEREST,
CONVENIENCE, OR NECESSITY
At first, Hoover had thought adequate regulation could be achieved simply
through allocation of physical facilities, regulation of frequencies and power, and so
forth. However, in 1925, he informed the national radio conference that, because of
"
7Radio Act of 1912, ch. 287, 37 Stat. 302.
1" Hoover v. Intercity Radio Co., 286 F. 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1923), writ of error dismissed as moot,
266 U.S. 634 (1924); United States v. Zenith Radio Corp., 12 F.2d 614 (1926).
" Radio Act of 1927, ch. i69, 44 Stat. i62.
"' On December 27, 1926, President Coolidge recommended that Congress act "to prevent chaos."
Among other things he said:
"Due to the decisions of the courts, the authority under the law of X912 has broken down; many
more stations have been operating than can be accommodated within the limited number of
wave lengths available; further stations are in course of construction; many stations have departed
from the scheme of allocation set down by the department, and the whole service of this most
important public function has drifted into such chaos as seems likely, if not remedied, to
destroy its great value ....
MESSAGE OF THE PRESIoENT OF THE UNiT.D STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 483, 69th Cong., 2d Sess. IO (1926).
For a description in some detail of the history of this period, see PART II, SEcoND IN'rRIm REPORT 59-86.
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the scarcity of facilities, it had become clear that permission to use broadcast
facilities must be based on public service, as there would not be enough channels for
everyone to operate as he pleased. 21 In these circumstances some principle of
selection among competing applicants for broadcast stations had become an urgent
national need. 2 Although reluctant to do so, Congress and the industry accepted
the inevitable logic of the situation as presented by Mr. Hoover-that a standard of
selection based on the public interest (the "public interest, convenience, or neces-
sity" familiar in public utility law) would necessarily be required.
Under the spur of the "breakdown of regulation," Congress acted almost im-
mediately to stave off collapse of the broadcast system. The result was the Radio Act
of 1927 and the introduction into broadcast regulation of several basic principles
which continue to guide our broadcast system. It might be well to keep these
in mind. They include the following: (i) Neither prior appropriation nor use
confers any prescriptive right to a broadcast channel. These are public property and
may be used only under license on terms provided by Congress. (2) One who accepts
use of a publicly owned broadcast channel does so as a "trustee" for the public,
and, in case of conflict, the interests of the public must take precedence over his
own commercial interests.2 (3) A licensee gains no right to the renewal of his
license,24 and he may be required to share his frequency with others and to conduct
himself as a proxy or fiduciary with obligations to present "views and voices" repre-
sentative of his community. Indeed he must act as the "mouth of the community"
on the air.2 His continuance as a licensee depends upon evaluation by the Com-
mission of the discharge of his responsibility and the forecast of his service to the
public in his community.
The provisions of the Radio Act of 1927, and particularly its standard of the
public interest, convenience, and necessity, were broad and sweeping in scope. They
"1 "Scarcity" is still a pressing problem in broadcasting and requires "sharing" of the use of facilities.
See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (I969).
29 See PARTr 1, SEcoNn INTERim REPoRT. See also PROcEEDINGs os FOURTH NATIONAL RADIO CON-
FERENCE (1925).
"8 "It is plain . . . that a radio broadcasting station must operate in the public interest and must be
deemed to be a 'trustee' for the public." McIntire v. Win. Penn Broadcasting Co., 1x F.2d 597, 599
(1945), cert. denied, 327 U.S. 779 (1945).
"See WHDH, Inc., 16 F.C.C.2d i (z969), for an example of how tenuous a renewal applicant's
position may prove to be. Among the responses to this decision was the introduction of a bill, S. 2004,
which provided for a limited property right for existing licensees by immunizing them from com-
peting applications while the FCC made its renewal decision. See S. 2004, 9st Cong., ist Sess. (1969).
In response to the post-WHDH confusion and public outcry, the FCC has recently issued a new
position statement to the effect that "if the applicant for renewal of license shows in a hearing with a
competing applicant that its program service during the preceding license term has been substantially
attuned to meeting the needs and interests of its area, and that the operation of the station has not
otherwise been characterized by serious deficiencies, he will be preferred over the newcomer . ... "
Policy Statement on Comparative Hearings Involving Regular Renewal Applicants, 18 P & F RAmo
RE. 2d 1901, 1904 (1970).
"
5 See Great Lakes Broadcasting Co., 3 FRC ANN. Rap. (I929), modified, 37 F.2d 993 (D.C. Cir.
1930), cert. denied, 281 U.S. 7o6 (1930). See also Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367
(1i96).
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established machinery for the regulation of radio in a manner as drastic as any ever
imposed on an industry.
Rarely have the problems which later developed in an industry been so accurately
foreseen. Rarely has such ample provision been made in an initial statute to cope
with those problems. The fact that the role of broadcasters as trustees for the public
interest has often been obscured by commercial interest does not make that basic
regulatory principle any less valid and potentially effective. From time to time, the
courts have jogged the memory of the industry, and sometimes of the Commission,
to recall the extent to which acceptance of a broadcast license involves dedication of
property and motivation to the public interest.2 6
IV
Ti CONCENTRATION PROBLEM
Congress was fully aware when it enacted the Radio Act of 1927 that the right
to license broadcasters and limit the number of stations would necessarily deny
to many individual Americans their "basic right" to express themselves and com-
municate their ideas, thoughts, and impressions through the new medium. The
act also would necessitate choice and censoring of broadcast matter either by the
government or broadcasters. After much deliberation, the full program responsibility
was placed at the community level in the hands of local licensees. Thus, Congress
" See Judge Learned Hand's opinion in National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 47 F. Supp. 940,
945-46 (S.D.N.Y. 1942):
"[the public, convenience, interest, or necessity] .. .demands the widest practicable variety in
the choice of programs available for broadcasting; that system which will most stimulate and
liberate the ingenuity of those who purvey them to the public."
See also Justice Frankfurter's remarks in National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 19o, 2x9
(1943):
"In the context of the developing problems to which it was directed, the Act gave the Commission
not niggardly but expansive powers."
See also Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (i969):
"... the people as a whole retain their interest in free speech by radio and their collective right
to have the medium function consistently with the ends and purposes of the First Amendment.
It is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is para-
mount."
In Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.',d 994, 1003 (D.C.
Cir. 1966), vindicating the right of a public group to intervene in a licensing proceeding, the Court,
through Judge (now Chief Justice) Burger, forcefully reminded the industry and the FCC of the public
nature of the broadcast calling:
"The argument that a broadcaster is not a public utility is beside the point. True it is not a
public utility in the same sense as strictly regulated common carriers or purveyors of power, but
neither is it a purely private enterprise like a newspaper or an automobile agency. A broadcaster
has much in common with a newspaper publisher, but he is not in the same category in terms of
public obligations imposed by law. A broadcaster seeks and is granted the free and exclusive use
of a limited and valuable part of the public domain; when he accepts that franchise it is bur-
dened by enforceable public obligations. A newspaper can be operated at the whim or caprice
of its owners; a broadcast station cannot. After nearly five decades of operation the broadcast
industry does not seem to have grasped the fact that a broadcast license is a public trust
subject to termination for breach of duty."
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sought to avoid centralization of program control by demographic and geographic
dispersal, at the grass roots level, of the right to choose and censor programs. Despite
the vast growth of the industry and the present "practical reliance" of affiliates on
networks for programming, the ultimate responsibility to program as "trustee" or
"proxy" for the public remains that of the local station. This is as true in television
as in radio and applies to network affiliates as well as independents.
Economic power and its effect upon control of the production, selection, and
distribution of broadcast programs have caused recurring problems virtually since
radio came into being. At an early stage, it was decided that radio would be most
useful if it were operated as a locally controlled medium supplemented by national
service.27 The latter could be provided only through interconnection, which carried
with it the risk that trivia would take over in radio service, and the need to see
to it that the "worthwhile" be retained as the basis of broadcast service was early
recognized 8
The network concentration problem arises because of the inherent characteristics
"The First Radio Conference was convened in x922 to consider problems of regulation of radio.
It was presided over by Herbert Hoover and consisted of representatives of the executive and legis-
lative branches of the federal government as well as representatives of all segments of the then rapidly
developing broadcast industry. The conference took seriously its mission to define and develop a useful
social rule for radio and concluded among other things that "radio communication is a public utility
and as such should be regulated and controlled by the Federal Government. ... G. Anciea, HisToRy
OF RADio TO x926, at 250 (1938). For the history of the development of the regulatory concept under-
lying radio regulation, see PART II, SECOND INTERIM REPORT.
" At the Third National Radio Conference in 1924, when networks as such had not yet developed,
Hoover foresaw the need for and value of national program service.
"(Radio] must bring instantly to our people a hundred and one matters of national interest. . . .
This can be accomplished by regularly organized interconnection on a national basis with
nationally organized and directed programs for some part of the day in supplement to local
material."
But he also foresaw the dangers of concentration of control of broadcast programs.
'. . . It would be unfortunate, indeed, if such an important function as the distribution of
information should ever fall into the hands of the Government. It would be still more un-
fortunate if its control should come under the arbitrary power of any person or group of
persons. It is inconceivable that such a situation could be allowed to exist. .. ."
And he recognized the need for assumption of responsibility for broadcast content.
".... It is not the ability to transmit but the character of what is transmitted that really counts....
For the first time in history we have available to us the ability to communicate simultaneously with
millions of our fellowmen, to furnish entertainment, instruction, widening vision of national
problems, and national events. An obligation rests upon us to see that it is devoted to real
service and to develop the material that is transmitted into that which is really worthwhile. For
it is only by this that the mission of this latest blessing of science to humanity may be right-
fully fulfilled."
REcosIENDATIONs POR REGULATrON OF RADio, supra note 16, at 3-4.
One hears the echo of Mr. Hoover's philosophy forty-five years later in the words of Mr. justice
White.
"It is the right of the public to receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral, and
other ideas and experiences which is crucial here."
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.s. 367, 390 (1969) (emphasis added). This sentence can be
far reaching in its effect. Does this constitutional right of the public require the Commission to devise
and enforce standards as to the social, esthetic, and moral "ideas and experience" to be provided by
broadcasting?
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of television as both an advertising medium and a social instrument. Its solution,
therefore, must be found in terms of balance between the commercial need for
efficiency and convenience in national advertising, on the one hand, and the national
need for conscious promotion of social and cultural goals through a "multitude
of tongues," speaking from the vantage of the feasible maximum of "diverse and
antagonistic" creative sources, on the other 9 A blend of these characteristics is
necessary to an economically viable commercial system which, at the same time,
serves the total public interest in television service. The national network has
become an integral and essential part of that service.
In chain broadcasting ° individual licensees had originated the programs and
shared them with other licensees by means of direct wire connection. This arrange-
ment did not involve a major deviation from the pattern of broadcast responsibility
at the community level written into the Radio Act. Shortly after the high degree
of utility and profitability of radio as a national advertising medium had become
apparent, means of providing programming, commercials, and interconnection
for the convenience of advertisers on a one-transaction basis became commercially
desirable. The network was the result. Stations readily fell into line as this arrange-
ment relieved them of a large part of the effort and expense of programming.
The network, of course, is the more sophisticated commercial concept. It uses
chain broadcasting methods of interconnection but involves a much higher degree
of program selection and control. During the course of consideration of the Radio
Act of 1927, Congress concluded that networks, even in their then somewhat primi-
tive state, threatened eventual centralization of broadcasting. It was realized that
if "chain broadcasting" companies, which by then were rapidly evolving into net-
works, were not subject to regulation, large companies would "be able by chain-
broadcasting methods practically to obliterate the independent small stations." 3'
The Radio Act contained authority, later incorporated into the Communications
Act of 1934, empowering the Radio Commission and later the Federal Communica-
tions Commission to make special "regulations" with regard to "stations engaged
in chain broadcasting."3 2  Such authority is supplemental to the Commission's
licensing function and was intended to enable the Commission to deal with the
"concentration" problems which Congress believed would arise in the rapidly
expanding field of broadcastingP3 Although the regulatory potential of this authority
is great, it has been used only sparingly.
"Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. I, 20 (1945).
" The terms "chain broadcasting" and "network" have often been used as synonyms. The resultant
confusion of identity has tended to obscure their essential differences. Chain broadcasting envisions a
program originated by one station and carried by other stations-usually on an occasional basis.
A network envisions a regularly organized system of interconnected stations who "clear" programs
provided by a central source, the network organization.
"
1 FCC, REPORT ON CHAIN BROADcASTING 86-87 (1941).
"Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 3 o3 (i) (1964).
"Later the Supreme Court of the United States took note of the purpose of Congress to avoid
monopolistic control in FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. X34, 137 (1940):
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Networks, as had been anticipated, rapidly became the principal source of station
programming and greatly affected the ability of individual licensees to manage their
own affairs in the way Congress had intended they should. Radio networks, through
various devices but principally through the optioning of time, directly controlled
the allocation of the greatest part of desirable time on stations across the country.
In large measure they controlled station operations. Indeed, by 1939, networks had
become so dominant in broadcast operations that a minority of the Federal Com-
munications Commission concluded, "There is no open market in the business of
broadcasting as in other businesses.... [It is] licensed by the Government to operate
as a form of monopoly in the public domain." 4 However, at the same time, the
majority of the Commission concluded that the American system of broadcasting
could be operated as a community-oriented competitive enterprise served by national
networks. It felt that the Commission should assert its full authority under the
Communications Act to foster a climate in which radio would not only retain
and expand advantages and benefits of network broadcasting to the public but would
also preserve an adequate degree of program choice to the licensee at the community
level. To accomplish this dual purpose, the Commission enacted its Chain Broad-
casting Rules. The purpose, and to some degree the effect, of these rules was to
preserve the opportunity for network broadcasting while giving fuller sway to
licensee initiative at the local level 5
Hence, we see that the fears of monopoly and centralization of the subject
matter control in interconnected broadcasting expressed by Mr. Hoover in 1924 were
prophetic of the future. As he had warned, the great benefits to the public from
the program service supplied by national "interconnection" were accompanied by
a strong tendency toward centralization of control of broadcast matter in a few
hands. As he had feared, "a small group" of network executives acquired a sub-
stantial portion of "the right to determine what communication may be made to the
American people." Television, of course, has supplanted radio as the principal net-
work medium. The tendency toward centralization still persists; indeed, it appears
to have accelerated.
To operate a television network effectively as a medium of national advertising
necessarily involves a high degree of centralized control of program selection. Net-
"Congress moved under the spur of a widespread fear that in the absence of governmental
control the public interest might be subordinated to monopolistic domination in the broadcast
field."
"FCC, RrPORT ON CHAIN BROADCASTING, supra note 3z, at 116-17. For a fuller statement of the
reasoning of the minority, see PART II, SECOND INTEiuat REPORT.
"'The Commission said:
"If radio broadcasting is to serve its full function in disseminating information, opinion, and
entertainment, it must bring to the people of the nation a diversified program service.
"... Chain broadcasting makes possible a wider reception for expensive entertainment and
cultural programs and also for programs of national or regional significance which would other-
wise have coverage only in the locality of origin."
REPORT ON CHAN BROADCASTING, supra note 31, at 4.
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work managers "offer" a regular program service together with commercials for
simultaneous transmission by large numbers of affiliated stations. Such schedules
occupy a substantial part of the broadcast day. Most affiliates "clear" a very high
percentage-ninety per cent or more-of the programs offered by their networks.
The "practical alteration" in the statutory pattern of program responsibility to
conform more nearly to commercial considerations was justified by networks and
advertisers and acquiesced in by stations as necessary to continued commercial sup-
port for radio.3 6 It was assumed to be "dictated" by the realities of "competition"
among broadcasters and advertisers for public attention and approval. Advertisers
had "learned" through experience and research that it was they and not the
networks and stations who bore the brunt of public apathy or displeasure from
unpopular or controversial subject matter. To displease or annoy even a small part
of the listening audience became-and remains-in large measure a matter of grave
concern to advertising experts and their clients, since such displeasure was and is
thought to have an adverse effect on the impact of advertising and marketing. This
attitude led to the demand-soon conceded by networks-that advertising agencies,
in the interests of efficient and effective marketing, be accorded the "right" to a
decisive voice in program production and selection. This same custom has carried
over into network television.
Contrary to what has generally been thought, advertiser involvement in pro-
gramming has not always been detrimental to its quality. Indeed, many of the best
programs-those which, over the years, have been accorded critical acclaim-have
been advertiser-supplied3 Instances of censorship of programming on behalf of
supposed commercial interests disclosed in the Commission's Program Inquiry8
were at least as prevalent in programs entirely controlled by networks as they were
in advertiser-controlled programs. Indeed, by and large, the average network pro-
gram which is planned, produced, and slotted into prime time before it is sold
must necessarily take account of the views of the most conservative advertisers as
to subject matter.
In the main, network program choice became a function of advertising and only
incidentally a means of community service. In this process, the local station licensee
became merely an adjunct of the network programming process. The "interest, con-
venience, and necessity" of the "national public" for programs as determined by
advertising considerations rather than program judgments of licensees became the
criterion of broadcast service. As stated above, in television as in radio, licensees
bear the sole legal responsibility to supply programs designed to serve the needs
and interests of their communitiesP9 But, under present practices in network tele-
31 Virtually the same argument is presently made to justify network program control in television.
" These are such programs as US. Steel Hour, DuPont Shows of the Month, Armstrong Circle
Theater, Robert Montgomery Presents, and Voice of Firestone.
" See INTERIm REPORT.
" For a full discussion of licensee program responsibility, see Report and Statement of Policy re en
banc Programming Inquiry, 25 Fed. Reg. 7291 (196o).
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vision, licensees have little or no opportunity to perform these essential parts of
their duty as trustees for the public, since their ability to obtain programs necessary
to serve these needs and interests depends in large measure on the schedules offered
them by network corporations 0
The bulk of television station programming comes from three sources: (a) the
three network corporations via some form of interconnection; (b) "syndication,"
which can be defined for present purposes as the distribution of programs produced
for television and sold on a station-to-station basis as programming for nonnetwork
use; and (c) theatrical film usually produced for and originally distributed in motion
picture theaters. Old and not so old theatrical motion pictures have, during the past
several years, become a staple of network programming where formerly they were
largely confined to local station broadcasting.
Each of the three network corporations has gradually increased its schedule
so that in the fall of 1969 each was offering an evening schedule which extended
pretty much from 6:30 or 7:00 p.m. until well after midnight. All three networks
were offering a late night "talk" show from ii.3o p.m. to I a.m.; these shows for
the most part take the place of feature films, which are becoming both scarce and
expensive. The largest part of these schedules consists of television films, although
an increasing share is composed of theatrical motion pictures. 4' In truth the net-
works have become arbiters of what the American people may see and hear on
television.
V
NETwORK PROGRAM PRODUCTION AND PROCUREMENT
As network television became the principal national advertising medium and
large national concerns shifted their main advertising from radio to television, a
considerable number of independent television program companies came into the
field and dealt directly with sponsors. By the 1955-56 season, approximately half
of the entertainment programs comprising the combined schedules of NBC and
CBS in prime time were conceived, designed, and produced by independent television
40 In its Policy Statement the Commission concluded:
"Although the individual station licensee continues to bear legal responsibility for all matter
broadcast over his facilities, a structure of broadcasting, as developed in practical operation, is
such-especially in television-that, in reality, the station licensee has little part in the creation,
production, selection and control of network program offerings. Licensees place "practical
reliance" on networks for the selection and supervision of network programs which, of course,
are the principal broadcast fare of the vast majority of television stations throughout the
country."
Id. at 7295.
"'At present fourteen hours per week of network evening programming is feature film. Indeed such
is the pressure of demand on supply that two networks (CBS and ABC) have gone into production
of features to be shown first in theaters and then on television-presumably first as network programs
and then released in "syndication" for station use. NBC has entered into joint arrangement with
a major film company for the same purpose.
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producing firms who retained the copyrights but sold exhibition rights directly to
advertisers.42 In these cases, the network manager simply approved the original
series pro forma and continued to evaluate the subject matter simply to assure that
basic network policies as to taste, decency, and so forth were being followed. In
such cases, the network had no direct relationship with the independent producing
firm and acquired no financial or proprietary interest in the program 3
Since the network method of television program distribution relies on the
custom of national advertisers, a high degree of centralization of the network pro-
gramming process in the hands of network managers seems inevitable. However, if
economic policies and practices which tend unduly to accelerate the natural trend
toward centralization of control are pursued by network managers, a situation may
well develop where television network managers can and do exercise not only the
power of economic life and death over independent producers of television programs
but also dominate the choice of the impressions and ideas which the American
public are permitted to "see and hear" through television.
To understand, however, how and why the concentration problem has arisen,
it is necessary to understand how programs are produced and procured for network
exhibition. Each television network is composed of approximately 2oo affiliated
television stations connected by facilities provided by the American Telephone and
Telegraph Company. The network acquires a conditional right to sell time on the
station and to supply programs and commercial announcements which the affiliate
may broadcast or not as he sees fit.44 The affiliate is compensated by the network
for carrying the program if a network advertiser sponsoring the program orders
the affiliated station and the station chooses to exhibit the program. The cost of
quality, mass appeal television programming is so great that no individual licensee
(nor, for the most part, even multiple owners) can afford to produce it for himself.
Thus individual affiliates are dependent, in large measure, on the network for the
programs which attract their principal nighttime audiences and, hence, provide them
with economic "goods" of high profitability.
A network is an organization-in a sense an agent-which sells to advertisers
the right to sponsor programs throughout the country on the large number of
stations which compose the network 5 The amount paid by the advertiser depends
"'For the week of April 17-24, 1955, between the hours of 6 and is p.m. on NBC twenty-eight out
of forty-three programs were supplied by advertisers; during the same week eighteen out of forty-seven
programs on CBS were supplied by advertisers. See Exhibit No. 83, Public Proceedings of the FCC
Network Program Inquiry (Before James D. Cunningham, Chief Hearing Examiner), No. 12782 (F.C.C.,
1959).
"'In radio many programs were produced by advertising agencies; in television this has rarely been
the case.
84 "Clearance" of network programs, however, is high-9o% or more in evening time slots.
" Most stations are owned by persons other than networks. Each of the three national television
networks (ABC, NBC, and CBS) is licensee of five VHF television stations-the limit allowed to one
owner by the FCC. The balance of each network is licensed to others who enter into affiliation contracts
with the network.
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on whether the network furnishes the program or whether the advertiser does so.4
Where the advertiser brings in the program, he pays only a charge for the time
period and use of the network's facilities. Each network publishes a rate card
setting forth these time charges. However, at present, eighty-five to ninety per cent
of all evening time is sold in the form of "minutes" on network controlled programs.
The price of minutes differs from program to program and depends on various
factors related to advertising impact, circulation, and so forth. Network-supplied
programs can be either of two types. When a program is network-produced, all
rights in the program are owned by the network, and the network company em-
ploys creative talent, a producer, and a director in addition to using its own
production facilities.4 7 When the program is "packager-licensed" the network
acquires from a producer or a "packager" the exclusive first-run right to broad-
cast the series on the network. By contract, custom, or informal acquiescence the
network gets a large say as to the creative aspects of the program.
A network acquires the initial network broadcast license-"commits to a series"--
through a contractual arrangement with the producer of the production company.
This is usually negotiated by a so-called talent agent who represents the packager
and receives a fee for his effort-usually ten per cent of the over-all price for the
program. The network agrees with the producer that he will film a certain number
of episodes for a series and give the exclusive first-run license for such episodes to
the network. The contract may be for any duration but usually covers a period
of years, with the network having the right to cancel at stated intervals.
Networks invariably finance their own program development costs, but packagers
often rely on outside financing. In such cases, the packager often obtains the financing
from a network in exchange for a share in subsidiary revenues. When the program
is packager-produced, the network usually "commits to a series" with the packager
and schedules the program for broadcast, selling sponsorship to one or more adver-
tisers. If the network has not previously financed development costs, it often acquires
a share in subsidiary revenues, which will be discussed later, for the "risk" it takes
in committing to the series before it has been sold to sponsors. In exchange for
network broadcast rights and such of the subsidiary rights and interests as the
parties agree to include, they usually bargain and agree on a single price per episode.
The price per episode varies from one program series to another depending on the
anticipated value of the series, its cost, and the extent of the rights and interests
acquired by the network.
Occasionally a network or an advertiser will commit itself to a program series
"a Only a very small fraction-about 4%-of evening programming is advertiser supplied at present.
Approximately 96% is either produced by or licensed directly to the network. Where the program or
series is so licensed, the network exerts very considerable, if not total, creative control of program
content.
" Only 4.8% of network evening entertainment programs were network-produccd in 1968. See
page 622 supra. Networks, however, produce almost all their news and public affairs offerings.
- ... ~ .... ai &. ......s ... a.j %X.2. -
CONCENTRATION OF TV PROGRAM CONTROL 625
on the basis of a story line or a program script.4 8 The more common practice, how-
ever, is to defer commitment until after the production of an entire "pilot" program.
A pilot may be defined as a sample film (or tape) episode for a proposed series that
can be shown to prospective sponsors and which can later be used as one of the
series episodes as the series is produced. Also, in some instances, the scripts for
episodes are developed before the series is committed and produced.49 Preparation
of a story outline, script, or pilot costs the producer a substantial sum (as much as
$*40,000 or more for a one-hour pilot), which cannot usually be recovered if the
series is not produced. Producers therefore often seek or even require someone-
frequently a network-to undertake or share this financial risk."
There are a variety of financing arrangements between networks and producers.
The most common type is the step-by-step arrangement through which the network
finances each stage of production of a pilot and has the right to discontinue at any
stage; for example, it can terminate the arrangement after preparation of the script.
Small packagers sometimes receive development financing from larger packagers
as part of joint venture arrangements or where the large packager has received
financing from a network. In addition to development financing, a packager often
needs financing for the production of a continuing program series. Indeed, it is
rare for a packager to finance the entire cost of a series production. Banks and other
conventional lending sources often play a role in financing series with the security
of a network contract, but these conventional sources are rarely involved in develop-
ment financing. Networks often undertake the risk of program development, which
is substantial. Except in rare cases, the cost of program development can only be
recovered if the program becomes a series, and a significant number of programs
do not become series.
Another functional difference between commercial exploitation of radio pro-
gramming and television programming substantially affects the economics of pro-
duction and distribution. Most radio programs were "live." In television, from an
early stage, much of the programming was produced on film. Many filmed pro-
grams and program series were made specifically for television. A substantial
number of such "filmed series" were distributed from station to station in what
came to be known as "syndication." Soon the subsidiary rights-largely but not
exclusively the right to exhibit a network series after its network run-began to
acquire substantial values. The right to exhibit a network series after its network
"8A story line is a very simple outline of the characters and action in a proposed program or
series. A "script," as the name implies, is a developed play with dialogue, stage directions, and so
forth.
"In a live program series, of which there are a few in network television, no pilot, of course, in
this sense is made. Often, however, a simple program is filmed or taped for viewing by networks and
advertisers.
"The network is frequently not the source of financing. For instance, between sg 6 o and I965,
approximately .5o% of all new network series were so-called "free balls," that is, programs which were
financed independently.
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run is the right to act as syndicating agent-that is, the right to act as agent in selling
the program to stations for nonnetwork exhibition in the United States (the "domestic
syndication right") or in other countries (the "foreign syndication right"). Less
important subsidiary revenue sources are as follows: (a) the right to share in the
receipts from syndication (after distributing agents' commissions and other deduc-
tions); (b) the right, known as the merchandising right, to exploit, as agent, the
license to manufacture such things as wearing apparel, toys, games, jewelry, novelty
items, and so forth, related to a program; and (c) the right to share in the receipts
of the exploitation by the merchandising licensee (the merchandising interest).
Also, there are other nonbroadcast interests in the program, such as the right to
make the program into a motion picture or play or the right to publish books,
magazines, or music based on the program. While sometimes of considerable value,
these rights are normally not as profitable as syndication and merchandising rights.
In network-produced programs, subsidiary rights are usually retained by the
network. In other programs these rights are sometimes retained by the packager,
who may have his own distribution organization, but they are often turned
over to a network or to some other syndicator or merchandiser engaged in such
activities. (Each of the three national television networks operates extensive domestic
and foreign syndication divisions.) When a packager is the producer and licenses
directly to the network, as is the case with a large part of entertainment pro-
gramming, the networks usually acquire either the syndication distribution right,
or profit shares, or both.61 In addition, these arrangements usually accord network
corporations the right to participate in the creative process to the extent necessary to
assure themselves and mass advertisers that the program or series will initially be
designed to attract large circulation and that subsequent episodes of a series will
adhere to the "formula" originally designed.5 2
"-From i96o to 1964, 114% hours of packager-licensed programming were accepted for evening
offering by the three networks. Networks financed the "pilot" in about 5o% of these cases. However,
for forty-three hours (37.6%) they obtained domestic and/or foreign syndication distribution rights,
and for ninety-three hours they received profit shares. As the total of 136 hours exceeds 1X4%/ by a
substantial margin, it seems clear that in a number of instances the networks obtained both distribution
rights and profit shares.
='As CBS has stated in its ANN-A.L REPORT TO STOcxHoLDE£s, at x2 (1963):
"The ability to produce a program schedule which year after year commands the largest
audiences in broadcasting is founded on a steadfast commitment to two fundamental programming
principles. The first is to obtain the talents of those writers, producers, directors and performers
whose outstanding abilities and dedication permit no compromise with anything less than their
best efforts at all times. The second is the continuing participation of the Network's programming
officials at every stage of the creative process from the initial script to the final broadcast. This
applies not only to the occasional special program, but to the day-to-day production of continuing
program series.
"By adhering to these principles the CBS Television Network commanded the largest night-
time audiences in network television throughout the year, averaging eight of the top ten
programs and 23 of the top 40." (Emphasis added.)
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Vi
PRESENT SITUATION IN NETWORK CONTROL
Formerly, many network television programs were developed and brought to
the market in "pilot" form by independent producers at their own account and
risk. A reasonably broad market was then available to such producers.5  It was
composed of a large number of sponsors and potential sponsors of network pro-
gramming in addition to the three network corporations. The first-run exhibition
rights to many such programs were sold by independent producers directly to
sponsors and, subject to network approval as to scheduling, suitability, good taste,
decency, and other factors, were exhibited as network offerings. Sponsors chose
programs in accordance with their diverse needs from a program market provided
by independent poducers.
In recent years (since 1957 or 1958) the market in which an independent pro-
ducer of television can sell his product has progressively contracted. The percentage
of independently provided programs in the schedules of all three national television
networks has declined sharply. Such programs, in effect, have been supplanted in
network schedules by programs-in many cases hour-length film series and, more
recently, feature films-supplied by outside producers but procured and controlled
(both creatively and economically) by network corporations. In procuring these
programs, network corporations almost invariably acquire the exclusive right to
first-run network exhibition directly from the producer and schedule the program
series in choice evening time. Often the network corporations "buy" a program
series and "slot" it in the schedule before sponsorship has been obtained and thereby
assume the economic risk of selling advertising positions in the program-usually to
several different sponsors. 4
The figures show a big increase in network controlled, packager-licensed pro-
grams. Such programs may be produced with or without network financial
assistance. Invariably where network financing is provided, and frequently where
it is not, the network corporations acquire, in addition to the first-run right, the
right to share in the profits from the network run, the right to distribute and/or
share in the profits from domestic syndication and overseas sales, and other valuable
subsidiary rights. Coincidentally, there has been a very sharp decline on all three
r3For example, for the week of April 15-21, 1956, between the hours of 6-11 p.m., on CBS twenty-
three out of forty-nine programs (or 46.9%) were programs in which the network had no financial
or proprietary interest, and on NBC for the same period twenty-three out of forty-one programs (or
56.1%o) were programs in which the network had no financial or proprietary interest.
"*In many cases the quid pro quo to justify the grant to network corporations of distribution and
profit sharing rights is simply the assumption of the risk of sale to advertisers. Because of a con-
tinuing seller's market in network advertising, the network "risk" can perhaps be inferred from a state-
ment by Dr. Frank Stanton, president of CBS, Inc., as quoted in the trade press. "If the Surgeon
General's report on smoking leads to decline in cigarette advertising, CBS will be able to more than
offset such losses by acquisition of new advertising business." BROADCASTING, Jan. 20, 1964, at 9.
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networks in the number of programs independently produced and licensed to
advertisers.
Table i summarizes in percentages the sources of all evening (6-11 p.m.) pro-
grams and all evening entertainment programs carried on the three networks during
a representative week in 1957 and 1968. Where in 1957 independents provided
approximately one-third of the evening network schedules, their share in 1968 had
declined to less than five per cent. Conversely, programs produced by or in con-
junction with network corporations now occupy more than ninety-five per cent of
the weekly evening hours on the three network corporations combined.
The inability of independent entrepreneurs successfully to compete in the so-
called network television program market except upon terms dictated by network
corporations seems obvious from the above figures. The ability of network corpora-
tions to dictate the terms of entry to the network television program market is a
function of their control of broadcast time on large combinations of local television
facilities, permitted by the commercial convenience and willing acquiescence of
television licensees.
TABLE i
SoURCEs OF EVENING NETwoRK PROGRAMS, IN PERCENTAGES, x957 AND 1968
All Evening Programs Entertainment Programs
1957 1968 1957 1968
(i) Network-produced 29.5% 15.7% 23.9% 4.8%
(2) Network participation (produced
by others and licensed to network
corporations) 29.5 80.7 39.3 91.2
(i) and (2) combined 59.0 96.4 63.2 96.0
(3) Independently provided 33.4 3.0 36.1 3.4
It appears that the increase in financial and proprietary control of the production,
procurement, and scheduling process by network corporations has been accompanied
by an increase in bulk circulation programs attractive to mass advertisers and
a progressive increase in their evening rates.
The results of the evolution of program practices above described as they affect
procurement of network programs have been (a) to concentrate economic, pro-
prietary, and creative control of program production and procurement in network
corporations; (b) to concentrate residual rights to television programs in network
corporations; and (c) progressively to limit the market available to independent
producers of network programs for all practical purposes to the three network corpo-
rations and, hence, to restrict the profitability of the operations of independent pro-
gram producers. The total effect of this condition has been a marked tendency
to centralize control of what the American public may see and hear through tele-
vision in network corporations and thus to hamper the competitive development
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of "diverse and antagonistic" sources for television program service. This is almost
the exact reverse of that "condition of competition" within the framework of service
in the public interest intended as the principal criterion of choice of program fare
under the American system of broadcasting.
VII
Ti DOMEsTIc SYNDICATION AND FOREIGN TELEviSION PROGRAM MARKETS
In addition to offering network schedules to affiliates, the three television network
corporations engage in domestic syndication (both to their own affiliates and to
other stations) and in foreign sales of television programs as regular parts of their
business. During approximately the same span of time when network corporations
devised and perfected program production and procurement practices, through
which they progressively acquired economic and creative control of all but a small
portion of their evening schedules, they expanded their activities in the sale of filmed
programs and series in the domestic syndication and foreign markets. Formerly,
the domestic syndication market was regarded by television station licensees as their
principal alternate source of television programs. Under modern program procure-
ment practices, production and procurement of programs for network exhibition
and for syndication have become directly related activities. In large measure they
involve the same persons and the same programs. Syndication of programs produced
for television which are reasonably competitive in quality with current network
offerings, has become a by-product of network program production and procure-
ment.
As stated earlier, in the initial process of program procurement for network
exhibition, network corporations often acquire the right to distribute the program
or program series in syndication after the network run. This right is then assigned
to the syndication division or arm of the network and is commercially exploited in
station-by-station sales for nonnetwork exhibition. The result is that a large part
of the programs ultimately available for syndication stems from the same transaction
as do network programs and simply involves a subsequent use of a program which
is designed for network broadcast. Syndication as a truly alternate source of prime-
time station program service has thereby been substantially constricted. The im-
portance of this development, which came about through normal commercial motives,
may be realized when one considers that the health of our television system depends
on a supply of programs chosen in the public interest from the feasible maximum
of "diverse and antagonistic" sources. As a result of the massive shift to film
and the procurement and production practices of network corporations, the great
bulk of the programming available for syndication, not only from network syndica-
tion divisions but from all other distributors, at present consists of "off-network"
product. A first-run syndication market composed of quality mass appeal syndicated
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programs available to compete with network offerings in prime time has virtually
disappeared.
About 1955, questions arose and complaints were made to the Federal Com-
munications Commission and to committees of Congress that network managers
would not allow the exhibition of filmed series without network acquisition of
subsidiary rights. It was asserted that, with increased frequency, networks would
not accept independently produced, advertiser-supplied programs for network exhibi-
tion unless producers and/or advertisers granted the network involved financia)
and proprietary interests in the form of syndication and other rights in the
program our television stations no matter who bears the licensee responsibility
small part of the revenues and profits of network corporations. Network corpora-
tions claim that the acquisition of rights to subsequent distribution of programs is
merely an ancillary economic activity to minimize the "enormous risks" they run
in procurement and financing of programs for their schedules. However, it also
appears that the potential expansion of both domestic and foreign markets for
American television programs is great. The overseas market especially may expand
rapidly. With the expected increase in the number of American television stations
in the UHF band, there will in all probability be a large increase in the domestic
market for television programs. Under present program practices of network corpo-
rations, the available staple to compete with network evening offerings in these
markets will continue to be "off-network" film series. Unless more competitive
opportunity is provided for independent television program producers, it seems
inevitable that network corporations will expand their control of these markets.
In other words, for all practical purposes the networks will, in large measure,
program our television stations no matter who bears the licensee responsibility
and whether or not the station is affiliated with a network.
VIII
STEPS TOWARD A SOLUTION OF THE CONCENTRATION PROBLEM
On March 22, 1965, the FCC issued its Notice of Proposed Rule Making in Docket
12782, which proposed to deal with concentration of control of television program-
ming. The Notice was the result of a long public inquiry in which upwards of
200 witnesses had been heard over a three-year period, and many hundreds of
documents had been examined. Staff reports submitted to the Commission as a
result of this inquiry concluded, among other things, that policies and practices
pursued by network corporations tend unduly to restrict competition-both economic
and creative-in the production and procurement of programs for television exhibi-
tion; that entry into network television program markets for independent program
producers is substantially impeded; and that network corporations control the source
of supply of television programs and dominate competition in both the network and
syndication program markets. The staff suggested that the Commission, through
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the exercise of its rule-making authority, seek to reduce these existing competitive
imbalances and to encourage and maintain increased competition in television pro-
gram production and procurement.
The rule as proposed would (I) eliminate network corporations from the
syndication business within the United States and from the sale, licensing, and
distribution of independently produced television programs in foreign markets;
(2) prohibit network corporations from acquiring distribution or profit-sharing
rights in syndication and foreign sales of independently produced television pro-
grams; and (3) limit economic and proprietary control by network corporations
of the programs included in their schedules in desirable evening network time.
However, it would preserve the right of network corporations to sell or otherwise
dispose of syndication, overseas, and other subsidiary rights in programs produced
by them or by persons controlling, controlled by, or under common control with
them, and to distribute programs of which they are the sole producers in foreign
markets.
Finally, on May 4, 1970, the Commission adopted rules55 along these lines to
provide a "healthy impetus" to the development of the feasible maximum of diverse
sources for network programming. These rules were designed to alleviate the
concentration of control described in this paper and to encourage production of
the widest practicable variety of programs available for television broadcasting and
provide network affiliates with something more than nominal choice in the exercise
of their responsibility as "trustees" to serve the diverse needs and interests of their
communities in providing television program service.
The rules will restrict the broadcast by commercial stations in the top fifty markets
in which there are three or more operating commercial television stations to no more
than three hours of network programs between the hours of 7:oo and 11:oo p.m.
(6:oo and i:oo p.m. Central time), thereby opening up evening time to competition
among present and potential alternate program sources. Special programs concerning
fast-breaking news events, on-the-spot coverage of news events, and political broadcasts
were excepted from the definition of "network program." Also, the rules prohibit
networks from engaging in the business of distributing nonnetwork programs in
domestic syndication or otherwise. Networks may not acquire rights to the sub-
sequent commercial use of programs and series which compose network programs.
No longer will networks be permitted to "compete" in the domestic syndication
and nonnetwork program market; no longer will the networks be permitted to
acquire, as part of the bargaining process for network exhibition, distribution and
profit-sharing rights in domestic syndication and foreign distribution. They may
engage in foreign distribution of programs of which they are the sole producers, but
must not distribute such programs nor share in the profits from such distribution.
" Amendment of Part 73 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations with Respect to Competition
and Responsibility in Network Television Broadcasting (Report and Order), No. 12782 (F.C.C., May 4,
1970).
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Networks will be permitted to sell the distribution rights to their own program
products to other domestic distributors.
The Commission said that an "unhealthy situation" presently exists in television
service. It emphasized that "[o]nly three organizations [the three national television
networks] control access to the crucial prime time evening schedule.""0 The Com-
mission recognized that access to the top fifty markets, or a substantial share of
them, is essential to the economic viability of a nonnetwork producer who proposes
to compete for station time with network prime-time quality programming. It
decided that the public interest would be served by curbing network occupancy
of high-rated evening time and thereby giving other program sources competitive
opportunity to contest for market entry by seeking the custom and favor of affiliate
licensees. Independent nonnetwork producers are presently at such a competitive
disadvantage that prime-time, first-run syndicated programming has virtually
disappeared. "Such programming is the key to a healthy syndication industry
because it is designed for a time of day when the available audience is by far the
greatest.
' 5 7
The Commission also found that close network supervision of so much of the
nation's programming centralizes creative control. It tends to work against the
diversity of approach which would result from more independent producers develop-
ing programs in both network and syndication markets.
The Commission found that network participation in syndication, either through
distribution or profit sharing, involves at least a potential conflict of interest. "Cer-
tainly," said the Commission, there is a "close correlation" between the acquisition
by networks of syndication and other subsidiary rights and interests and the choice
of a program or series for inclusion in the networks' schedule
5 8
The Commission said that under present conditions independent producers who
desire to exhibit their product initially on a network and then offer it in domestic
syndication and foreign markets must first bargain with the networks, who are
their principal competitors in syndication and foreign sales, for the network exposure
necessary to establish the subsequent value of their programs as valuable commercial
assets in domestic syndication and foreign sales. They are usually required to grant
to the networks either the distribution rights or large shares in the profits from
domestic syndication and foreign distribution, or both, for the program. Similarly,
a producer who seeks to distribute his programs in foreign countries must compete
with the networks, who, through bargaining with the same and other independent
producers, control the source of supply of the programs which constitute the staples
of his market and/or share in the profits from such distribution by others. Networks
do not normally accept new, untried packager-licensed programs for network exhibi-
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tion unless the producer/packager is willing to cede a large part of the valuable
rights and interests in subsidiary rights to the program to the network.
The Commission said:
If networks are prevented from operating as syndicators or from sharing in
the profits from distribution by others in the domestic syndication market, there
will no longer be any inducement to choose for network exhibition only those
packager-licensed programs in which they have acquired other rights. Further-
more, producers and packagers will be enabled to fully benefit from their own
initiative and presumably become more competitive and independent sources of
programming since in many instances a packager cannot recoup his outlay from
the first network run of a series or program and must look to the commercial
uses of the program subsequent to the network run for commercial success.
Relieved of the need to grant a network a large portion of his potential profit the
producer's ability profitably to operate in network television will be greatly en-
hanced. With the expanded syndication market as a feasible alternate to network
exhibition his bargaining position will be improved and he can be expected to
develop into a stable and continuing alternate source of programs and ultimately to
compete for network time. 9
The Commission pointed out that its objective was not to create "reverse option
time" for any program source, but to permit independent producers to vie with
each other and with the networks for the custom and favor of stations on something
approaching an even basis.
The Commission was not persuaded that the so-called 5o/5o rule would have
the adverse consequences which its opponents predicted. On the contrary, the
Commission concluded that that proposal would accomplish "its intended purpose
without undesirable side effects."6 It decided for several reasons-among them the
possibility of unfavorable effects on internetwork competition-to adopt the Prime
Time Access rule. The Commission will continue to observe and study the results
of its present action to determine whether the rules adopted are sufficient for the
purpose of adequately diversifying and multiplying sources of television pro-
gramming. It published its findings regarding the 5o/5o rule as an appendix to its
opinion. In this regard the Commission said:
Diversity of programs and development of diverse and antagonistic sources of
program service are essential to the broadcast licensee's discharge of his duty as
"trustee" for the public in the operation of his channel. We note that the degree
of network control of their evening schedules has been steadily increasing; indeed
there has been a substantial increase since we issued our Notice in 1965. This
tendency should be reversed and the networks should take the lead in encouraging
the inclusion of the feasible maximum of independently controlled and independent-
ly provided programs in their schedules. In this way we may more nearly achieve
the goal described by Judge Learned Hand in 1942, and echoed by justice White
in 1969, of a television broadcast structure which is served "by the widest practicable
'id. para. 29.
00 1d. para. 4.
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variety" of choice of programs available for broadcasting; that system which will
most stimulate and liberate those who create and produce television programs and
those who purvey them to the public."
The Commission's action is a landmark in regulation of television networks and
their effect on the public interest in program service. A principal part of the rules-
that affecting syndication and other program rights-operates directly on network
organizations rather than on affiliate licensees as do the Chain Broadcasting Rules.
The Commission's action is in this respect largely one of first impression, and it is
controversial in many other respects as well.62 It will certainly be the subject of
further legal action, perhaps including reconsideration by the Commission and
appeals to the Supreme Court.
Ix
CONCLUSION
Diversity of television program sources is a matter of first importance, both to
the public and the industry. It involves the future course and social worth of broad-
casting as an implement of our society and democracy.
The conception of a broadcast system based on a union of commercial interest
and social responsibility which draws its service from a maximum of diverse and
antagonistic sources basically suits the genius of the American people.13 That execu-
tion of that ideal will at times doubtless falter does not detract from its utility as
a practical inspiration for the future.
Our system of broadcasting based on commercial enterprise is bound to be
the product of give and take among contending individuals. This is both a great
strength and a safety valve in our system. It is in the very nature of an advertising-
supported mass medium that it must serve the masses of our people. It must be
governed in large measure by commercial considerations which place some subject
matter limitations on its capacity to provide all kinds of programs, whether or not
they are attractive to substantial audiences. Advertisers and broadcasters cannot
be expected to permit programming to dominate prime hours if it appeals to and
attracts only a small fraction of the public. Nor ought a mass medium committed
to serve all the people be programmed for the few. But, equally, television should
provide programs in the evening hours to serve, in fair proportion, the tastes
:and needs of all substantial groups in the viewing audience.
We must, in our evaluation of television service, accept the inevitable subject
matter restrictions imposed by the essential nature of our commercial system. But we
:, Id. para. 37 (footnotes omitted).
'2 See, e.g., Dissenting Statement of Chairman Dean Burch, id.; N.Y. Times, May 8, 197o, at x, 63;
'Wall Street Journal, May 8, 197o, at 5.
" The expansion of public broadcasting under the Corporation for Public Broadcasting will, of
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also must be certain that unnecessary further restriction of the sources and subject
of programs are not imposed purely to maximize profits. At the peril of our social,
political, and cultural growth, we must see to it that television remains free to
develop and transmit the maximum of diverse ideas, concepts, and impressions which
our creative community with the willing support of the broad range of commercial
interests can provide.
Our fellow citizens who have undertaken to act as our "trustees" must temper
commercial interest with social responsibility and provide opportunity for the
maximum feasible development of sources for television service. Such an admixture
of practicality and idealism in the operation of this important implement of
democracy stands as a constant challenge to those who would have the world
believe that our society based on willing cooperation of responsible individuals is
archaic. To the totalitarian such a way of handling so vital a matter is incompre-
hensible nonsense. To us it is a way of life.
Judge Learned Hand remarked many years ago that the dissemination of ideas
by private enterprise through mass media is "one of the most vital of all general
interests." To meet the free speech and free press requirements of the first amend-
ment to the Constitution, such information and ideas should derive
from as many different sources, and with as many different facets and colors as is
possible .... [Our American system] presupposes that right conclusions are more
likely to be gathered out of a multitude of tongues, than through any kind of
authoritative selection.
To this he added his credo of faith in our democracy, "To many this is, and always
will be, folly: but we have staked upon it our all." 4 We assert to the world that
"democracy" and "America" still are convertible terms and that we will continue
to aspire to the ideal set by Walt Whitman and to assume "the task to put in forms
of lasting power and practicality . . . the moral political speculations of ages,
long, long deferred: the democratic republican principle, and the theory of develop-
ment and perfection by voluntary standards, and self reliance" in the "civilized
rivalry" of free competitive contest."5
course, add to over-all diversity, but, relatively speaking, noncommercial audiences are a mere drop in a
bucket. Television's principal impact will continue to derive from commercial stations and networks.
"United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943).
" W. Valr uraAN, DaasocRAinc VisTAs 1-2 (187).
